On 7 October 2023, Hamas launched an unprecedented terrorist attack on Israel by land, air and sea, killing 1,200 Jews, including civilians and soldiers, and slaughtering men, women, children and the elderly living in the kibbutzim and towns near the border, including Sderot. That same day, 250 were taken hostage: 101 of them are still held by Hamas. A few days later, the Israeli army (IDF) invaded Gaza, resulting in over 41,500 Palestinian deaths so far and over 96,000 wounded (this figure is to be updated), in addition to the destruction of entire neighborhoods, roads, schools and hospitals.
Negotiations to secure a ceasefire and the release of the hostages, brokered by the US, Qatar and Egypt, have so far been unsuccessful. One year on, the conflict has spilled over into Lebanon, with Hezbollah as its target. In this interview with SIR, Claudio Bertolotti, an expert at ISPI – the Italian Institute for International Political Studies – and executive director of Start InSight (http://www.startinsight.eu), analyses the past 12 months of war.
At what point is the Hamas – Israel war?
One year on, despite military achievements by both sides, neither Israel nor Hamas can claim victory in this war. Israel’s occupation of Gaza has effectively decimated Hamas’s war capacity by a third and Israel proved that it is also capable of decapitating its leadership, which is a success. However, it should be stressed that Israel was able to free only a few hostages through military operations. In fact, most of those who returned home were released as a result of a temporary, mutually advantageous deal. Hamas successfully resisted in military terms. Its organisation, though battered, is still largely intact and reorganising. Looking beyond this year of war, I believe that Hamas could even increase its popular support if the ongoing conflict should escalate into an insurgency, which would be the worst-case scenario, for it would force Israel to face the same difficulties that the US and the US-led coalition faced in Afghanistan and Iraq.
So far, despite US, Egyptian and Qatari mediation, no agreement has been reached to bring the hostages home. Why?
It seems reasonable to conclude that, for political reasons and given the recent successes of the Israeli military campaign on the ground, the Netanyahu government is unlikely to backtrack at this stage. It must be emphasised that Netanyahu’s government has not won and has not yet succeeded in achieving its objectives. Nevertheless, the Jewish state is in a position to do so.
I’m afraid that the hostages have ceased to be regarded as an overriding priority and have instead become a potential political tool that could be presented as the price to be paid for freedom from terrorism.
The events of 7 October revealed the fragility of Israel’s own security. Can this be considered a defeat?
7 October is Israel’s 9/11. This emotionally charged tragedy reawakened the deep-seated fears of Israelis, prompting the Israeli government to implement a series of defensive barriers, implement the Iron Dome system and spend significant sums on security.
On 7 October, a surveillance system that was supposed to be invincible and unconquerable was overestimated. Instead, it proved to be extremely vulnerable.
Israel’s ‘September 11’ was therefore followed by an internal reorganisation of the entire security system to ensure that such events never happen again.
Israel’s military campaign against Hezbollah continues in the West Bank and Lebanon, in addition to the occupied and virtually destroyed Gaza, which is facing a very serious humanitarian crisis. How much longer can Israel bear the economic burden of this war?
Israel felt this burden immediately, from the first months of the war, when it called up a record of 360,000 reservists, Israel’s largest ever military conscription, taking many workers out of the productive fabric. This had a severe negative impact on the Israeli economy, so much so that by December 2023 many of these mobilised units had already been ‘demobilised’. The cost of the war is reflected in the country’s GDP (Gross Domestic Product), the impact of which the Israeli government is trying to mitigate by reducing the number of its troops. But it should also be remembered that the real cost of the war is largely borne by the US, which supports Israel without ifs or buts, regardless of which political party occupies the White House.
In the war against Israel, Hamas seems to have established itself in the last few months as the only remaining champion of the Palestinian cause. Could the aforementioned popular support also come from Palestinians in the West Bank, ruled by President Abu Mazen and his Al-Fatah party?
Al-Fatah is taking great pains not to get involved in the political dynamics of Hamas, as this would be tantamount to embracing death and heralding its demise. But by not taking an open stance against Israel,
Al-Fatah proves to be increasingly distant from Palestinian aspirations and demands.
There is a serious danger that this stance might lead Al Fatah’s frustrated members to support the cause of Hamas, not so much in Gaza but, more dangerously, in the West Bank, where Hamas is seeking to open a new war front thereby pushing Israel to withdraw its troops from Gaza or increase its military operations, which would certainly not help the Jewish state’s popularity on the international stage. Moreover, the war has further crippled the already fragile Palestinian economy, with tens of thousands of Palestinian workers out of work. In addition, the military occupation, settler violence and popular discontent breed anger and frustration among Palestinians, while creating fertile ground for the spread of violent ideologies.
The killing of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah has marked another major escalation in the armed conflict between Hezbollah and Israel along the Lebanese border. Are we on the verge of a strategic shift from the military containment of Hezbollah to its complete destruction?
In my view, it is a preventive action on Israel’s part to limit the impact of external aggression. For Israel, Hezbollah is a “containable” threat. The problem, however, is that the totality of Israel’s pro-Iranian regional neighbours could pose a serious threat, especially as the Iron Dome system would risk being overwhelmed by a massive barrage of rockets and missiles that could result in its collapse. Given the risk of further Iranian retaliation and a concomitant attack by Hezbollah and other smaller regional players, including the Houthis, I believe that the rationale for reducing the threat posed by Hezbollah is consistent with the overall objective of avoiding becoming a vulnerable target for the so-called Axis of Resistance (Iran-backed, comprising Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and various Shia armed groups in Iraq and Syria, Ed.’s note).
How does Nasrallah’s death affect the conflict?
The killing of Nasrallah exposed Hezbollah’s extreme vulnerability and politically weakened status, lacking the high-level interlocutors it could count on in the past. The organisation will probably have to be completely rebuilt, a process that will take time.
How has ‘7 October 2023’ impacted the wider Middle East?
In my view ‘October 7’ marked an interruption in the natural, now inevitable, normalisation process, which entails the establishment of solid diplomatic relations between the Arab countries – first and foremost Saudi Arabia- and Israel, in accordance with the Abraham Accords.
Saudi Arabia has been adamant in its commitment to the continuation of this process of mutual recognition. And it couldn’t be otherwise. In fact, the current situation is unsustainable and risks escalating into a conflict, given Iran’s violent aspirations. ‘Oct.7’ forms part of a broader strategy aimed at freezing the negotiated agreements, thereby forcing Israel into a disproportionate response. Indeed, there was a reaction, but it did not produce the effect sought by Tehran.
Has October 7, 2023 destroyed all hopes for a solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict? Does the ‘two peoples, two states’ solution remain a viable option?
I remain realistic and somewhat optimistic from a theoretical standpoint. The two-state solution is still on the table, it has not been scrapped. The problem, however, is which Palestinian state, under which leadership and along which borders. There are still many unknowns, ranging from Israel’s demand that Palestinians be denied their own military capability, which is legitimate for any state, to Hamas’s aim, expressed in its charter, to wipe the state of Israel off the map. Not to mention the fact that, given the large number of settlements built by Israel in the Palestinian territories in recent years, the borders of a future Palestinian state are far from settled.
