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Ukraine. Bozzo (University of Florence): “Putin will not backtrack.”

Luciano Bozzo, professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies at the University of Florence, discusses the latest developments and the delicate balances involved in the second round of negotiations, which resulted in a cease-fire to create humanitarian corridors. The professor was one of the few who put in writing Putin's move ten days before the attack on Ukraine

(Foto ANSA/SIR)

It’s a chess game in the making and the stakes are high. The Russia – Ukraine conflict is seemingly unstoppable and risks eroding borders. Luciano Bozzo, professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies at the University of Florence, discusses the latest developments and the delicate balances involved in the second round of negotiations, which resulted in a cease-fire to create humanitarian corridors. The professor was one of the few who envisaged Putin’s move ten days before the attack on Ukraine. He warns: “in this war, the Russians are shedding more blood than anticipated, which makes it harder for Putin to backtrack.”

Professor, the second round of negotiations resulted in a cease-fire for the evacuation of civilians through humanitarian corridors. Was it expected?

The agreement could be encouraging, and it suggests that Russia is facing operational difficulties due to unexpected challenges.

Creating corridors to allow the evacuation of civilians is an obvious concern for anyone wishing to avoid the most dramatic consequences.

In your opinion, is the inclusion of civilians in negotiations an obvious development?

Civilians have played a role in the armed conflicts of the past decades, both as victims of attacks and because they may serve as a bargaining chip in the so-called ‘diplomacy of violence’, to gain advantage in the negotiations. From a strategic perspective, the besieged side could have an interest in the continued presence of the civilian population in the inhabited area because should the enemy enter by force, it would inevitably result in a high number of civilian casualties and a media backlash. In contrast, besiegers might have a stake in evacuating civilians to have free rein, but they could equally be keen to target the population in order to exert pressure on the adversaries’ political leaders.

Putin claimed that Russian troops are providing “safe corridors for civilians” but that “Ukrainian neo-Nazis” are preventing this and are treating civilians as “human shields”.

This claim may sound cynical but it encapsulates one aspect of the problem. The aggressor may consider the use of civilians to be an obstacle to his military action. As we have seen, civilians may well be armed to hinder the aggressor’s advance. But this creates a problem in terms of international law, because if Russian troops resort to indiscriminate use of force against the defenceless population, they will be charged with war crimes. However, if civilians attack the military, then the Russians are entitled to defend themselves. This means that civilians also play a role in the “negotiating process” wherein the warring parties strive to strike the best possible deal.

Has the invasion de facto overshadowed Ukrainian hostility towards the Russian-speaking majority populations of the Donbas, repeatedly denounced by Putin?

There is no question that a number of atrocities have been committed in the Donbas region. However, using this argument to justify the Russian attack is unacceptable. The atrocities must not be minimised, but a large-scale war for the occupation of a sovereign country is quite another matter compared to the deeds of paramilitary groups. In addition, the claim that

Ukraine is a neo-Nazi society to justify the aggression on this ground is not consistent with the fact that President Zelensky is Jewish.

Is there a danger that the war in Ukraine will continue for decades as happened in Syria?

This risk does exist, but it is combined with other risks.

Like the nuclear war alert?

The nuclear threat is a negotiating strategy. Putin accepted to sit at the negotiating table, but he also mentioned a nuclear disaster. It’s like placing a loaded gun on the table. The purpose of the gun is to inform the opposing party that you are prepared to wage a nuclear war. There is also a purely technical issue. After the end of the Cold War, the threat was no longer an issue, even though nuclear warfare systems still exist. Nukes are much more sophisticated now, but their power has been diminished.

Simultaneously, conventional weapons have become more powerful. In other words, in the event of an escalation, conventional warheads can be upgraded to nuclear warheads because they are equivalent in power. But the line is already crossed when nukes are deployed. Secondly, the fact that the conflict zone is surrounded by NATO countries is another risk factor. Clearly, unintentional incidents could occur at the points of contact or in the air space, which could trigger reactions from the opposing side.

One likely scenario would see Putin failing to achieve his goals in Ukraine. At that point he would lose momentum, both at home and abroad.

I doubt domestic dissent will be strong. However, if casualties increase, if Ukrainians hold out, and if external supplies continue to arrive, then Putin might decide to pull out of the conflict zone. At that point, however, he would lose face, which is unlikely. He has made it clear that he wants the Donbas region, power over the Crimean peninsula, and a written commitment that Ukraine will not join NATO. It is a question of what Putin is willing to give up and how much he can give up. Russians are spilling more blood in this war than originally estimated, which makes it harder for Putin to backtrack.

In the past few hours rumours of an internal coup to overthrow ‘Tsar’ Putin have also been circulating. How likely is that?

I think that this scenario is very unlikely. Eliminating autocrats is very hard, as history has shown. And then, let’s suppose it happens, are we certain that whoever takes Putin’s place would be better than him?

Does China’s abstention at the UN General Assembly vote on the resolution condemning aggression in Ukraine mean that the Beijing-Moscow axis is not that strong?

China is facing a challenging situation. On the one hand, it badly wanted a partnership with Russia – both sides are aligned in challenging the international order, and enjoy fruitful trade relations. China needs Russia’s raw materials, fossil fuels and cutting-edge military technology.

For their part, Russians need the investments and the commodities manufactured in China. In effect, these two countries would be natural enemies, since they share a disputed border and in economic and demographic terms Russia cannot compete with them. However, China defends the principle of the inviolability of national borders and therefore the Russian attack on Ukraine puts it in an awkward position.

China does not want to get involved in a war which it has no interest in. On the other hand, it is keen to ensure that attention is shifted to the Western front.

Has the US been weak or is it simply standing by?

Biden has adopted a cautious approach that I consider positive. If Putin decided to invade Ukraine now it is probably because the US lost credibility after pulling out of Afghanistan. Putin is a shrewd tactician, and he has been closely monitoring this too. Similarly, he felt that Europe was busy with other matters: Germany has a new leader, France is preparing for presidential elections.

The possibility that Pope Francis might act as mediator between Russia and Ukraine has been spoken of in Italy.

I think this is highly unlikely. The Pope has never been invited to Moscow and the only meeting with the Orthodox Patriarch took place in Cuba.

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